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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
O·F THE STAT'E OF UTAH 
SOUTHEAST FURNITURE COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
GRANITE HOLDING COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
9175 
BRIEF OF AP·P·ELLANT 
STATEMENT 1Qf FACTS 
The appellant, Granite Holding Company, was the 
defendant below, and the respondent, Southeast Furni-
ture Company, was the plaintiff. 
This being an equity action for specific performance 
on appellant's counterclaim, the appellate court may re-
view the facts as well as the law. 
For many years prior to 1941, the parties and others 
used a right of way that extended south and west of 
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the right of way referred to in this action. The present 
right of way was created by joint action of the parties 
and was substituted for the old right of way. The single 
question to be decided is whether or not the appellant 
is now entitled to continue to use the substituted right 
of way. 
The subject matter of this action is a right of way 
which runs easterly from 1\{cClelland Street approxi-
mately 500 ft. south of 21st South Street in the Sugar 
House area of Salt Lake City. This right of way amounts 
to a continuation of Elm Avenue which runs westerly 
directly opposite to it and on the west side of :\IcClelland 
A venue. The right of way is approximately 33 feet wide 
and 170 feet long. (Ex. D-3, D-9, R. 83, 133). 
This roadway is used by appellant and respondent 
and their customers and others to gain access to prop-
erty owned by appellant and respondent and others in 
the general areas east and north of this roadway. The 
roadway has, in fact, been used by the public generally 
for many years to gain access to the plaees of business, 
shops, and stores in this area. (R. 94, 95, 96, 117). 
The title to the land comprising the ''Test 130 feet 
of this roadway is in the respondent and the title to the 
land cmnprising the east 40 feet is in the appellant. (Ex. 
D-2, D-3, D-4, D-9, R. 132). 
Appellant clailns the right to the joint use of this 
roadway beceause of ownership of part of the land nlak-
ing up the roadway and by reason of an executed express 
oral agreement, or by reason of an in1plied agree1nent 
or by reason of estoppel, or as a public way. 
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For many years prior to about 1941, appellant and 
respondent and others gained access to the property in 
this area by means of a long, hazardous, inconvenient, 
roundabout and narrow right of way that entered east 
off of McClelland Street approximately 250 ft. south 
of the present roadway and curved northeast into their 
property in this area. (R. 84-90, 104, 105, 107, 113). The 
greatly increased business activity of the respondent, 
Southeast Furniture Company, made it very desirable 
for it to have a wider and more convenient means of 
access to its store properties from 1\icClelland Street and 
it repeatedy urged appellant to join with it in creating 
this new joint right of way. (R. 89-90, 107-8). The closing 
of the old right of way would also relieve respondent 
from a possible encroachment claim by a land owner 
who stood to gain by the closing of it. (R. 163-4). 
Accordingly, in 1941 it was agreed by appellant 
acting through Mr. Nephi J. Hanson, its President, now 
deceased, and respondent acting through Mr. S. E. 
Sorenson, its President, now also deceased, that the old 
right of way would be abandoned (R. 120) and a new 
joint right of way would be created by them to which . 
both appellant and respondent would have a joint right 
of use. (R. 85, 90-95, 98, 106, 107, 114, 117, 120-22, 133 
135, 136, 137). In fact, counsel for respondent agrees 
that if appellant had asked for a right of way deed at 
the time of the foregoing agreement by which this right 
of way was created, it would have been given. (R. 150) 
In 1941 contemporaneously ·with the foregoing agree-
ment, respondent acquired title to the land which became 
the western part of the roadway, and appellant tore 
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down rental garages on its land to open up and make 
available land for the eastern part of the roadway. (R. 
108-10, 113, 120-1, 136, Ex. P-6 and 7). Both parties 
thus joined in the actual physical preparation and cre-
ation of the roadway (R. 108). 
Upon the creation of the roadway, it was put into 
joint use by appellant and respondent and others, and 
thereafter, appellant, relying upon the agreement and 
conduct of respondent, took action which irrevocably 
closed its old right of way to the south, (R. 91, 117) and 
thereby abandoned, quit-claimed away (R. 135, 136, Ex. 
D-8) and extinguished its only other means of access 
to its property from McClelland Avenue. This new road-
way ever since such time has been and now is in con-
inuous use by appellant, respondent, and others (R. 107, 
122, 166). 
As evidence of the intent and agreement that this 
should he a roadway open to the joint use of appellant 
and respondent and others, appellant and respondent 
in 1942 jointly requested in writing that the Salt Lake 
City Commission dedicate this very roadway here under 
consideration as a public street and as an eastern ex-
tension of Elm A venue. In pursuance of this, the parties 
tendered executed deeds conveying their respective titles 
to the City. (R. 94-9·6, 144, 145, Ex. D-2, D-3, D-4). The 
City decided against dedication of the roadway inasmuch 
as its east end ter1ninated on private property, and the 
deeds were returned to the parties. (Ex. D-3, R. 98). 
For more than ten years the road·wav was used 
harmoniously by both parties and the public generally 
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(R. 107, 117, 119, 147-8), and there was never a question 
b~t what appellant and respondent had reciprocal rights 
of way over each other's property and a joint right to 
the use of the roadway pursuant to the earlier acts and 
agreements of the parties. (R. 115, 121, 139) During 
this time respondent posted no signs of any kind. (R. 
94, 99, 101, 102) In the meantime, the officers of appell-
ant and respondent who had entered into the agreement 
and who had acted in creating the roadway, died. 
Appellant's right to the use of the right of way was 
not questioned until about 1952 when appellant sought 
written evidence of it from respondent in order to satisfy 
an insurance company that was making a loan to ap-
pellant on its land in this area. Respondent refused to 
give appellant such written evidence unless appellant 
would pay an exhorbitant price of $10,000.00. (R. 137, 
138) Subsequently, intensely bitter feelings arose be-
tween appellant and respondent over this and other 
matters apart from this roadway (R. 145), and in an 
attempt to strike at appellant, the respondent filed a 
complaint against appellant initiating this action on 
l\1arch 30, 1954 (R. l) clai1ning rentals due respondent 
for the use by appellant of that portion of the roadway 
to which respondent had title. 
Such action was filed without notice and without 
prior claim to rent having been asserted in any way by 
Respondent. (R. 92, 139-40) Further, the complaint 
makes no allegation of any express agreement for the 
payment of rent. Appellant claims that it was about 
this time that the small sign shown in Exhibit P-5 was 
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posted concerning the penmss1ve use of the roadway. 
(R. 99, 102, 138, 146) The large sign that may have 
been posted earlier by respondent, was only directional 
to respondent's place of business. A. close examination 
of the picture of the large sign shown in Exhibit P -5 
clearly supports this. There can be seen showing through 
the white painted arrow the old original words "Service 
Entrance" even though an attempt has been made to 
paint them out. Any reference to permissive use origi-
nated with the small square sign placed of recent years 
about the time that respondent filed its complaint. (R. 
99, 138, 140, 146) There is no definite evidence as to 
when either sign was placed. However, it is clear no 
signs of any kind were posted for several years. (R. 93, 
99, 102, 138, 146) The appellant never considered that 
such signs pertained to it because of the prior agreement 
and acts of the parties (R. 140, 146), and the appellant 
and the public g·enerally, have eontinuously used and 
now use said roadway. 
On May 5, 1954, one 1nonth after the filing of the 
foregoing Complaint, appellant filed a motion to dismiss 
and an answer to the cmnplaint. Nothing was done by 
respondent to press its suit for alleged rentals for many 
years. (R. 27, 29) Finally, the appellant, in order to 
affirm its right to cross over that portion of the roadway 
to which respondent elain1s title and to settle the cloud 
on said right of way caused by the pending suit, filed an 
amended answer and counterclaim on September 9, 1958, 
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It is significant that respondent thought so little 
of the contentions of its complaint that it failed to ap-
pear on appellant's motion for leave to amend its answer 
and to file its counterclaim. Further, respondent made 
no effort to reply to the counterclaim which was duly 
served on Septmnber 24, 1958, and the default of re-
spondent was entered October 21, 1958. Appellant was 
awarded a default judgment on its counterclaim more 
than three months later on January 27, 1959. (R. 8, 16, 
27, 29) This default judgment was set aside on March 
9, 1959. Thereafter, respondent again did nothing to 
press the complaint and alleged claim for rent, and 
appellant advanced the case to trial by filing a notice 
of readiness for trjal on May 20, 1959. 
The case was set for trial on October 8, 1959, and 
at the commenceinent of the trial, respondent abandoned 
its alleged rental claim and voluntarily requested dis-
missal of its complaint. (R. 76) It developed in the 
course of the trial on appellant's counterclaim, that the 
evidence showed not only an executed oral agreement 
creating a reciprocal right of way over the adjoining 
land of the parties, but also a right of way by estoppel 
and that the conduct, history and use of the right of 
way amounted to the creation of a public highway 
through public use in accordance with 27-1-2 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, and an amended answer and counter-
claim to conform to this evidence was filed with leave 
of the Court. (R. 48, 53, 62) 
The appellant does not dispute the right of respond-
ent to use appellant's portion of the right of way, but 
seeks an affirmation of its right to the use of respond-
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ent' s portion of the right of way. In this regard, counsel 
for respondent stated frankly that respondent "is not 
asking that (appellant) be denied the right to the use 
of the right of way." (R. 92-3) Further evidence of this 
was the voluntary dismissal by respondent of its com-
plaint. (R. 76, 92) 
There is some evidence in the record that in recent 
years, appellant has moved to acquire an interest in a 
fifteen foot strip of land north of the present right of 
way. (R. 128, 151-2) This was done in desperation and 
as a possible escape in the event that the respondent 
should prevail in its recent change of position in regard 
to this right of way and to insure appellant's ability 
to perform its prior and long standing obligations to 
others to provide them a right of way. (R. 128-30) Re-
spondent objected to any attempt to so explain tlris 
acquisition in the course of the trial. (R. 152-3) 
It would irreparably damage appellant to lose its 
right in the substituted right of way. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
I. There is an executed oral agreement creating a ioint and 
reciprocal right of way over the adjoining lands of the 
parties. 
II. The executed oral agreement takes it out of the statute of 
frauds. 
m · The respondent is estopped to assert the statute of frauds. 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
V. There is an implied agreement creating a ioint and recipr-
cal right of way over the adioining lands of the parties. 
VI. The roadway has been dedicated and abandoned to the 
use of the public in accordance with 27-1-2 U.C.A. 1953. 
VII. There were no signs placed which prevented the creation of 
ioint and reciprocal right of way by any of the means re-
ferred to by appellant. 
VIII. It was error to set aside respondent's default iudgment on 
the counterclaim. 
IX. The failure of the trial court to rule upon the incompetency 
of witnesses to testify on particular matters was preiudicial 
error. 
X. The findings of the court are not responsive to and do not 
cover all of the material issues. 
XI. The findings and iudgment are contrary to the evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
There is an Executed Oral Agreement Creating a 
Joint and Reciprocal Right of Way Over the Adioining 
Lands of the Parties. 
It is not disputed that for some years prior to 1941 
the parties with others used a right-of-way located sev-
eral hundred feet south of the roadway now in question 
in order to gain access to their properties from Me-
Clelland Street. The appellant had reserved this right-
of-way out of land it formerly held. It was a narrow, 
inconvenient, roundabout right-of-way. Both parties had 
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a valuable vested interest in it as it was the only existing 
way they had to gain access to their properties from 
McClelland Street since their properties did not abut 
on McClelland Street. 
Further, it is not disputed that by the acts of the 
parties, a new, wide, direct, and much more convenient 
roadway was created to the north of the old right-of-way 
about 1941 which has been used continuously ever since 
by the parties and others as the only means available 
for them to gain access to their properties from Mc-
Clelland Street. The appellant provided the necessary 
land for the east portion of the roadway, and respondent 
provided the necessary land for the west portion. 
It is the contention of appellant that this new right-
of-way was created pursuant to an express oral agree-
ment which provided that appellant would have the right 
to the use of such right-of-way. The court below ruled 
that there was no such agreement. A review of the record 
indicates there is an1ple evidence to show such an agree-
ment. 
Witness Clyde F. Hansen testified that he was per-
sonally present and participated in the negotiations 
between appellant and respondent in which the oral 
agreement was n1ade concerning the right of appellant 
to use the new right-of-way. (R. 90, 91, 98, 107). At 
that time this witness was secretary-treasurer of ap-
pellant. 
Witness Willard B. Richards fron1 personal knowl-
edge testified concerning an agremnent for the creation 
and right of use of the right-of-way. His testnnony was 
that he personally talked to officers of the appellant 
10 
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and respondent at the time and on the scene where the 
roadway was being created by the demolition of build-
ings and the acquisition of new land, and he was told 
they were by agreement going to change the right-of-
way from the one going south. (R. 117, 120, 121, 122). 
Witness W. L. Hansen testified concerning the oral 
agreement by which the new joint right-of-way was cre-
ated and by reason of which the appellant had a right 
to the use of the right of way over the land of the re-
spondent. The evidence also shows that the existence of 
this oral agreement and resulting right was affirmed 
by action of appropriate officers of respondent on sev-
eral occasions (R. 133, 135, 136, 137, 146, 147, 149, 150). 
It is significant that at no place in the entire record 
is there any testimony for the respondent actually deny-
ing the existence of the oral agreement claimed by ap-
pellant. On the other hand, the circumstances and the 
acts of the parties all go to corroborate the evidence 
adduced by appellant that there is an executed oral 
agreement as claimed by appellant. 
The fact of the change of location of the right of 
way evidences the required meeting of the minds for 
the existence of the contract. The right-of-way could 
not have been changed except upon mutual accord and 
agreement. There is ample consideration to support the 
contract in that appellant abandoned and gave up a 
valuable right-of-way to the south and demolished in-
come producing buildings and thereby forfeited and 
permanently lost the monthly rental therefrom, and re-
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POINT II. 
The Executed Oral Agreement Takes it out of the 
Statute of Frauds. 
There is no question but what the parties have fully 
performed pursuant to their oral agreement for the 
creation and use of the new right of way. The appellant 
performed by tearing down its rental buildings to pro-
vide part of the necessary land for the right of way, 
abandoning its old right of way to which it cannot now 
be restored, and assisting in the actual physical prep-
aration and creation of the new right of way. The loss 
in rentals to appellant on the storage sheds since they 
were torn down approximately 19 years ago conserva-
tively a1nounts to at least $7,000.00. Respondent per-
formed by acquiring and providing part of the necessary 
land for the right of way, abandoning the use of the 
old right of way, and assisting in the actual physical 
preparation and creation of the new right of way. Fur-
ther, ever since the creation of the new roadway, the 
parties have jointly and continuously used and are now 
using the new right of way. The only thing that remains 
undone is the execution of cross deeds by the parties, 
and counsel for the respondent admits that this would 
have been done at the time had the appellant requested 
it. (R. 150) 
The appellant seeks judicial affirmation of its perm-
anent right to use the right of way and a decree for 
continued specific perforn1ance of the oral contract on 
the part of respondent. The appellant cannot be re-
stored to its former condition and right of way nor 
would damages adequately compensate it for its loss 
of this interest in land. 
12 
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It is a fundamental rule that executed or partially 
performed oral agreements are taken out of the Statute 
of Frauds and are enforceable. It is expressly provided 
by 25-5-8 U.C.A. 1953 that: 
"Nothing in this chapter contained shall be 
construed to abridge the powers of courts to com-
pel the specific performance of agreements in 
case of part performance." 
The rule that part performance of an oral agreement 
takes it out of the Statue of Frauds specifically applies 
to agreements relating to the creation of an easement. 
The following rule is stated in at 49 Am. Jur. 790, Sec-
tion 488: 
"The doctrine of part performance applies to 
a parol agreement for a permanent easement as 
well as to an agreement for the sale of land. Thus, 
an oral agreement for a private way or railroad 
right of way, for the establishment of a private 
road, street, or alley, or for a right of storage 
is enforceable in equity where the grantee has 
acted in reliance on the agreement so that the 
failure to enforce the agreement specifically will 
result in the perpetration of a fraud upon or in-
justice toward him." 
The following are specific applications of the gen-
eral rule and are contained at 101 A.L.R. 982, Part Per-
formance of Oral Land Contracts: 
"An oral agreement for the establishment of 
a private road will be specifically enforced, where 
it has been partly performed by the parties.'' 
"So, an oral agreement among several land-
owners that each will donate a strip of ground 
necessary to lay out a continuous street and high-
way will be specifically enforced against one 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
landowner at the suit of the others, where the 
latter have performed." (Brower v. Walker, 182 
Iowa 804, 166 N .W. 269) 
The acts of part performance may of themselves 
be such as to prove the contract and take it out of the 
statute of frauds. If the acts performed are such that 
they cannot be explained consistently with any other 
agreement than the one alleged, they may be relied upon 
as the sole proof of the contract. 
"The true rule is, however, as we think, very 
clearly stated by Pomeroy (Spec. Perf. Sec. 107) 
in these words : 'The acts of part performance 
must be such as show that some contract exists 
between the parties, that they were done in pur-
suance thereof, and that it is not inconsistent 
with the one alleged in the pleadings. Whenever 
acts of part performance are made out which thus 
point to a contract, the door is opened, 3;lld the 
plaintiff may introduce additional parol evidence 
directed immediately to the terms of the contract 
relied upon'; a proposition which the author sup-
ports by abundant citation of authorities." 
"If the acts of part performance prove the 
whole contract, there is no occasion for any parol 
evidence of is terms, and no difficulty whatever 
arises under the Statute of Frauds." (.Atulrew v. 
Babcock, 63 Conn. 109, 26 A. 715, 101 A.L.R. 961). 
There is ample evidence in the record to show an 
oral agreement by the parties to create the new joint 
right of way involved herein and give the parties re-
ciprocal rights to cross over the adjoining land of the 
other. Otherwise, how does the respondent explain the 
acts of the appellant in abandoning its only existing right 
of way and demolishing its rental buildings to provide 
14 
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land for the new right of way and all of the other acts 
of appellant and respondent in connection with the cre-
ation of the new right of way. Even though appellant 
was required to furnish some right of way for respond-
ent because of an earlier agreement, it would not have 
<·hanged the location of this right of way which it needed 
and was using if in so doing it lost its only existing right 
of way and became subject to the permissve use and 
eontrol of the respondent in the new right of way. There 
was no reason for the appellant to have put itself In 
this position, and the respondent has shown none. 
The acts of the parties in performance support the 
agreement as alleged. To hold otherwise would result 
in fraud on the performing party. 
"Part performance which will avoid statute 
of frauds may consist of any act which puts party 
performing in such position that nonperformance 
by other would constitute fraud.'' (Utah M ercur 
Gold Mine Co. v. Herschel Gold Min. Co., 103 Ut. 
249, 134 P.2d 1094) 
In the above referrd to Utah M ercur case the court 
found that the part performance supported and took out-
side of the statute of frauds an oral agreement to extend 
a written lease and in so doing used the folowing lan-
guage: 
"Whether the legal label given to the basis 
of plaintiff's claimed right to continue in possss-
sion of the property is equitable estoppel, irre-
vocable license, or an oral contract for a written 
extension taken out of the statute of frauds be-
cause of partial performance is not so important. 
These concepts are but forms designed to serve 
a more ultimate principle that no one shall induce 
15 
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another to act on promise of reward for such act 
and then after obtaining the benefit of the same 
repudiate the contract." 
POINT III. 
The Respondent is Estopped to Assert the Statute of 
Frauds. 
The courts have long since announced the funda-
mental rule that they will not allow the Statute of 
Frauds to be used as a shield for fraud. The type of 
fraud the courts have reference to is defined in 49 Am. 
Jur., Statute of Frat~ds, Sec. 580, page 888 as follows: 
"When one party induces another, on the 
faith of a parol contract, to place himself in a 
worse situation than he could have been if no 
agreement existed, and especially if the former 
derives a benefit therefrom at the expense of the 
latter, and avails himself of his legal advantage, 
he is guilty of a fraud and uses the statute for 
a purpose not intended - the injury of another 
- for his own profit. In such cases, ·equity re-
gards the case as being removed from the statute 
of frauds and will in proper cases enforce the 
contract or otherwise interfere to prevent the ap-
plication of the statute." 
Conduct amounting to estoppel is described at ±9 
.Am. Jur. Stattde of Frauds, Sec. 583, page 890 as 
follows: 
"The doctrine of estoppel to assert the stat-
ute of frauds against a clalin or defense based 
upon an oral contract is founded upon the general 
principles of estoppel in pais. The vital principle 
is that he who by his language or conduct leads 
another to do, upon the faith of an oral agree-
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changes his position to his prejudice, will not be 
allowed to subject such person to loss or injury, 
or to avail himself of that change to the prejudice 
of such other party.'' 
These rules are so well accepted as to require no 
further authority. The undisputed facts of this case fit 
all the requirements of this rule·. On the faith of re-
spondent's representation that a new joint right of way 
would be created and in reliance on the acts of respond-
ent in acquiring land that would be used as part of the 
joint right of way, appellant tore down rental buildings 
to make land available for part of the right of way, 
abandoned its only existing right of way, and has con-
tinued to this day some 19 years later to use the new 
right of way, and has used and developed its land in 
reliance thereon. 
POINT IV. 
A Right of Way Over Respondent's Land Has Been 
Created by Estoppel. 
It is the accepted rule that an easement in land can 
be created by estoppel. 
"It seems to be the generally recognized 
modern rule that the doctrine of estoppel in pais 
may be successfully invoked to preclude an asser-
tion of title to land; and it is generally recognized 
that permitting the doctrine of estoppel to oper-
ate in effect to transfer real estate does not con-
travene the statute of frauds. One may by estop-
pel in pais be precluded from asserting an equit-
able title to land; and an estoppel in pais may be 
asserted to raise an equitable title or interest in 
land as against the legal title. The modern rule 
is generally well settled that title to land or real 
17 
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property may pass by an equitable estoppel, which 
is effectual to take title to land from one person 
and vest it in another where justice requires that 
such action be done." (49 Am. Jur., Statute of 
F'rauds, Sec. 152, page 492) 
While easements are usually created by express writ-
ten grant, by prescription or by implication (and we feel 
that an easement has been created by implication as will 
be discussed later), 
". . . it has long been recognized by the court 
that an easement may exist by virtue of estoppeL" 
(17A Am. Jur., Easements, Sec. 18, page 631) 
"Notwithstanding the general rule as to the 
prerequisites to its creation, an easement may 
arise from an estoppel ... An easement by estop-
pel has been held to exist in a passageway over a 
boundary strip as a result of the reciprocal use 
of the strip by the adjoining owners as a passage-
way for a long period of time." (17 A Am. Jur., 
Easements, Sec. 21, pp. 633-4) 
In Forde v. L~bby, 22 Wyo. 464, 143 P. 1190, where 
the land comprising the right of way was contributed by 
both of the adjoining owners, the court said: 
"The original owners who were parties to the 
oral agreement, had become interested in main-
taining said alley because their improve1nents had 
been constructed with reference to it and its use 
in connection with their improvement ... The 
easement was established by estoppel by the acts 
and cond1tet of the original parties, and as be-
tween the1n, and upon the facts, they and their 
grantors were each estopped from denying such 
easement. It was as completely establiJshe.d as 
between them and their privies, and subjects thet'r 
parcels of land to the servitude as completely as 
though it were created by a deed for that purpose." 
18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In Wright v. Barlow, 169 Okla. 472, 37 P. 2d 958, the 
Oklahoma court cites with approval the Forde v. Libby 
referred to immediately above and states : 
"Courts of equity have declared that one or 
his privies ought to be estopped and denied the 
right to repudiate his acts when they have been 
relied and acted on, and when to do so would 
operate as a fraud or work an injustice. . . The 
owner of land, by his acts in pais may preclude 
himself from asserting his legal title .... '' 
"Where owners of adjoining lots orally agree 
on private way between lots and construct im-
provements with relation thereto, each is es-
topped from disputing the other's right of way." 
The facts of this case support the creation of a right 
of way by an equitable estoppel (estoppel in pais) 
and also by reason of promissory estoppel. These two 
kinds of estoppel shall be discussed as they fit the facts 
of this case. Equitable estoppel will be referred to first. 
"The doctrine of estoppel in pais is founded 
upon principles of morality and fair dealing and 
is intended to subserve the ends of justice . . . 
Estoppel of this character arises from the conduct 
of a party, using the word 'conduct' in its broad-
est meaning as including his spoken words, his 
positive acts, and his silence when there is a duty 
to speak. ... Accordingly, it holds a person to a 
representation made or a position assumed where 
otherwise inequitable consequences would result 
to another who, having the right to do so, under 
all the circumstances of the case, has in good faith 
relied thereon and been misled to his injury." (19 
Am. Jur., Estoppel, Sec. 42, pp. 640-42) 
The essential elements of an equitable estoppel as 
related to the party estopped and as related to the party 
19 
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claiming the estoppel are set out and discussed at 19 Am. 
Jur., Estoppel, pp. 642-51 and 730-742. Each of these are 
listed below and discussed as they fit the facts of this 
case. 
A. As Related to the Party Estopped: 
1. "Conduct which amounts to a false representa-
tion or concealment of material facts, or at least, 
which is calculated to convey the impression that 
the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, 
those which the party subsequently attempts to 
assert." 
Respondent here openly acquired and made available 
new land for use as part of the new right of way, ob-
served the appellant tear down its rental buildings 
to make its land available for part of the right of way, 
acquiesced in the appellant and those claiming through it 
to use the new right of way for many years, and knew 
or had reason to know that appellant and those claiming 
through it abandoned the only other existing right of 
way. 
2. "Intention, or at least expectation, that such 
conduct shall be acted upon by the other party . 
. . . An actual intent to mislead or defraud is not 
essential. ... It is enough if there \Yas a holding 
out to all who might have occasion to act of the 
existence of a certain state of facts which they 
might assume to be true and upon which they 
might act.'' 
In this case, it could reasonably be assu1ned that ap-
pellant would act on the strength of the conduct of the 
respondent, and it did in fact so act. It is not contended 
that respondent necessarily had an intent to deceive or 
mislead by its conduct, holding out, and acquiescence in 
20 
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connection with the creation and use of the right of way. 
However, as already pointed out, it is not always neces-
sary that a fraudulent purpose be present at the inception 
of the transaction. 'The fraud may, and frequenly does, 
consist in the subsequent attempt to controvert the repre-
sentation (conduct) and to get rid of its effects and thus 
injure the one who has relied on it. 
3. "Knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real 
facts.'' 
Respondent had actual knowledge that appellant was 
tearing down its rental buildings to make land available 
for part of the right of way. It knew that there were 
several others who claimed the use of a right of way 
through appellant and that appellant was obligated to 
provide a right of way for them. Respondent kne-vv or 
should have known that with the creation and use of the 
new right of way, the old and only other existing right 
of way was abandoned and allowed to be closed. 
B. As Related to the Party Asserting the Estoppel : 
1. "Lack of knowledge and of the means of 
knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question." 
For many years after the creation of the new joint 
right of way in this case, there was no question concern-
ing the permanent right of appellant to use the newly 
created right of way. Appellant's use has been uninter-
rupted and continuous. Appellant did not know and had 
no means of knowing that respondent claimed that appel-
lant had no permanent reciprocal right to cross over 
that portion of the joint right of way owned by respond-
ent. Respondent claims that a sign that was posted 
should have conveyed this knowledge to appellant. In 
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this regard, the evidence in its most favorable light to 
respondent shows that there was a lapse of at least 
several years before the first sign was posted. A detailed 
discussion concerning any signs that were placed is set 
out in Point VII below. Further, appellant contends, and 
the prior understanding and course of conduct of re-
spondent and appellant pertaining to the creation and use 
of the right of way justifies such contention, that it did 
not consider any signs, if placed, applied to it, but that 
they applied to the general public. 
2. "Reliance on the conduct of the party estopped." 
There is no question but what appellant in good faith 
relied upon the conduct and representation of respondent 
in participating in the creation of the right of way and 
making it available to the use of appellant. But for this 
reliance, appellant would not be in its present predica-
ment. 
3. "Action based on such reliance of such a char-
acter as to change his position prejudicially.'' 
In reliance on respondent's conduct and representa-
tion, appellant tore down its rental buildings and contri-
buted its land to the right of way, lost the rental there-
from totaling at least $30.00 per n1onth, and abandoned 
the only other existing right of way and allo·wed it to be 
closed. 
It is submitted that the undisputed evidence supplies 
all of the above required elements and clearly supports 
the creation of a right of way by equitable estoppel. 
The creation of the joint right of way is also sup-
ported by promissory estoppel. The evidence in this case 
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1nakes out a classic situation for the application of this 
doctrine. 
"There are numerous cases in which an es-
toppel has been predicated on promises or assur-
ances as to future conduct." (19 Am. J ur. Promvs-
sory Estoppel, Sec. 53, page 657) 
The Restatement of the Law of Property, Vol. 5 on 
Servit~tdes, Section 524, page 3173 sets forth a rule on 
"Promises Enforceable by Estoppel" and a rationale that 
fits perfectly the facts of this case as follows: 
"An oral promise or representation that cer-
tain land will be used in a particular way, though 
otherwise unenforceable, is enforceable to the ex-
tent necessary to protect expenditures made in 
reasonable reliance upon it. 
"Owners of neighboring lands are prone to 
enter into informal agreements respecting the 
future use of their respective lands in which each 
agrees to use his land in a way that will benefit the 
other. The relationship of trust and confidence 
frequently existing between neighbors tends to 
produce a very considerable degree of casualness 
and informality in their dealings with each other. 
Adjustments in improvement and use are fre-
quently made on the basis of their informal under-
standings. If the observance of these understand-
ings is not compelled, much hardship may result. 
To prevent such hardship, informal agreements to 
use land are enforced to the extent necessary to 
protect those who have acted in reasonable reli-
ance upon them. . . .'' 
"The phrase 'though otherwise unenforceable' 
as here used means that the promise could not be 
enforced were it not for the application of the 
doctrines of estoppel.'' 
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The application of the doctrine of promissory estop-
pel is discussed at 19 Am. Jur. Estoppel, Sec. 53, page 
658, as follows: 
"The doctrine of promissory estoppel is most 
widely recognized and most frequently applied 
in cases of promises or representations as to an 
intended abandonment of existing rights." 
The facts of this case fall ''rithin this specific appli-
cation of promissory estoppel. Respondent acquired the 
land cmnprising its portion of the joint right of way and 
represented and agreed that appellant would have a right 
to the use of it as a means of access to its property, and 
in pursuance of this right, the appellant has used the 
joint right of way for many years. By joining in the cre-
ation of the new right of way and agreeing to appellant's 
right of use, the respondent represented that it was giv-
ing up or abandoning a valuable and existing right and 
relinquishing part of its fee title in its part of the land 
that was used in creating the right of way. In reliance 
on this representation of the abandonment of an existing 
right, the appellant abandoned its only other existing 
right of way, tore down sheds, lost rentals, and contri-
buted a portion of the land for the new right of way. 
The facts of this case bring it squarely within prom-
issory estoppel rule set down in Ravarino· v. Price, Utah 
260 P. 2d 570 as follows: 
"Generally, the doctrine of equitable estop-
pel is applicable only when a 1nisrepresentation is 
made as to past or present facts; however an 
exception is recognized "'When a misrepresentation 
as to the future operates as an abandonment of 
an existing right on the part of the party making 
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the misrepresentation. 21 C.J. 1142, Bigelow on 
Estoppel, (6th Ed.) 637). .Actually this exception 
is a limited application of the doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel. 31 C.J.S., Estoppel Par. 80. The 
general principal of promissory estoppel is em:-
bodied in the Restatement of the Law of Con-
tracts, Sec. 90, under the heading of 'Informal 
Contracts, \Vithout Assent or Consideration,' as 
follows: 
'A promise which the promissor should rea-
sonably expect to induce action or forbearance 
of a definite and substantial character on the part 
of the promisee and which does induce such action 
or forbearance is binding if injustice can be 
avoided only by the enforcement of the promise.' 
"Promissory estoppel is historically rooted as 
a substitute for consideration, Allegheny Colleoe 
v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 246 N.Y. 
369, 159 N.E. 173, 57 A.L.R. 980, per Cardozo, C.J. 
citing 1 Williston on Contracts, Sections 116, 139; 
however it is applied where the promise of the 
promisor as to his future conduct constitutes the 
intended abandonment of an existing right on 
his part. In Waugh v. Lennard, 69 Ariz. 214, 211 
P. 2d 806, the defendant induced the plaintiff to 
refrain from commencing action on a promissory 
note by representations that he would not invoke 
statute of limitations as a bar. The court held the 
defendant was estopped from raising the defense 
of the statute, basing its decision on cases where 
the promisor had manifested an intention to aban-
don an existing right, and quoting the Restatement 
of Contracts, Sec. 90. For similar illustrations, 
see Schroeder v. Young, 161 U.S. 334, 16 S. Ct. 
512, 40 L. Ed. 721; Faxon v. Faxon, 28 Mich., 159; 
Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578, 25 L. Ed. 618; 
3 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 689, p. 1988. 
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"The common element in these cases is that 
the promise as to future conduct constitutes a 
manifestation that the promissor will abandon 
an existing right which he possesses." 
POINT V. 
There is an Implied Agreement Creating a Joint 
and Reciprocal Right of Way Over the Adioining Lands 
of the Parties. 
If the court is of the opinion that there was no ex-
press oral agreement, there is ample evidence to show 
an implied agreement to vest in appellant a right to the 
use of the new right of way. 
The Restate1nent of the Law of Contracts, 8ec. 5, 
states how a promise may be made: 
" ... A prmnise in a contract must be stated 
in such words either oral or written, or must be 
inferred wholly or partly from such conduct, as 
justifies the promisee in understanding that the 
promissor intended to make a promise." 
The following concerning in1plied contracts is set out 
at 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, Sec. 4 p. 498: 
"In an express contract all the terms and 
conditions are expressed between the parties, 
while in an implied contract, son1e one or n1ore 
of the terms and conditions are implied frmn the 
conduct of the parties." 
The rule of implied contracts is further stated as fol-
lows: 
"Express contracts are those in which the 
terms of the agreement are fully and openly in-
corporated at the time the contracts are entered 
into, while implied contracts are such as arise by 
26 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
legal inference and upon principles of reason and 
justice from certain facts, or where there i!S cir-
cumstantial evidence showing that the parties in-
tended to make a contract. (McDonald v. Thomp-
son, 184 U.S. 71, 46 L. Ed. 437, 22 S. Ct. 297). 
In 27 ALR 2d 332 there is a discussion of the problem 
of mutual or cornmon use by adjoining owners, for a 
common purpose, of a strip of land owned in part by each. 
In the summary and comment the compiler at page 338 
states the following concerning an implied oral agree-
ment: 
"A use by adjoining owners, for a common 
purpose, of a strip of land over and along their 
boundary strongly suggests s.ome kind of agree-
ment therefor, and in most cases the fair ~mpli­
cation has been that the use originated in a mere 
oral agreement.'' 
The creation of the new right of way herein required 
and involved the following specific actions and conduct 
on the part of the appellant and respondent, all of which 
are undisputed in the record and from which an agree-
ment can be implied: 
1. Appellant tore down at least three storage sheds 
owned by it to provide the east part of the land necessary 
to make the new right of way. 
2. The appellant has lost rentals at the rate of at 
least $30.00 per month since that time from such sheds. 
(R. 108, 109) 
3. Appellant assisted in the actual physical pre-
paration and building of the right of way. 
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5. Appellant has directed the use and improvement 
of its property in reliance on the use of the right of way. 
6. Respondent acquired at a cost of less than 
$200.00 (R. 121, 135, 136) the land necessary for the west 
part of the right of way. 
7. Each party executed and delivered deeds to Salt 
Lake City covering the land owned by each which com-
prised the right of way and joined in reqeusting that it 
be dedicated as a public highway. 
8. For many years the right of way was jointly 
used with no notice of claimed permissive use or claim 
for rental arising. 
It is inconceivable that such specific action was taken 
by the parties without an intention in both parties as to 
the right of way so created. There is ample testimony 
in the record that conversations were had by the parties 
preceding and during these actions which make out such 
an intention and assent. 
"The statute of frauds cannot operate as a 
defense to the creation of an easement by implica-
tion. 
"It should be noted that even though a grant 
of an easement is embraced within the operation 
of the statute of frauds and must consequently be 
in writing, an executed parol grant of easement 
will be upheld and sustained under the same cir-
cumstances and upon the same principles that a 
parol contract would similarly be sustained.'' ( 49 
Am. Jur., Statute of Frauds, Sec. 182, p. 514) 
This Court within the past few months has had occa-
sion to apply the law of ilnplied agreements in the two 
Utah land dispute cases of Harding v. Allen, 353 P. 2d 
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911, and Johnson Real Estate Co. v. Nielson, 353 P. 2d 
918. While these were boundary dispute cases, they in-
volved the same principles as the case herein and the 
establishment of the rights of the adjoining landowners 
based on their long period of conduct in regard to their 
land. These cases both referred to two earlier cases of 
Ringwood v. Bradford, 2 Utah 2d 119, 269 P. 2d 1053 and 
Brown v. Mulliner, 120 Utah 16, 25, 232 P. 2d 202, 207 
and quoted the following: 
". . . in the absence of evidence that the own-
ers of adjoining property or their predecessors 
in interest ever made an express parol agreement 
as to the location of the boundary between them, 
if they occupied their respective premises up to 
an open boundary line visibly marked by monu-
ments, fences or buildings for a long period of 
time and mutually recognized it as the dividing 
line between them, the law will imply an agree-
ment fixing the boundary as located, if it can do 
so consistently with the facts appearing and will 
not permit the parties nor their grantees to de-
part from such line." 
It is also noted in the concurring opinion in Hummel 
v. Young, Utah, 265 P. 2d 410 which refers to the early 
case of Holmes v. Judge, 31 Utah 269, 87 P. 1009 that the 
establishment of an express agree1nent in situations in-
volving principles similar to what we are here concerned 
with is not necessary nor controlling. 
The undisputed specific actions of the parties cannot 
be reasonably accounted for except on the postulate that 
an agreement or understanding (express or implied) 
existed as to the use of the newly created right of way 
as contended by appellant. 
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POINT VI. 
The Roadway Has Been Dedicated and Abandoned 
to the Use of the Public in Accordance with 27-1-2 
U.C.A. 1953. 
Public use which constitutes dedication is defined 
by 27-1-2 U.C.A. 1953 as follows: 
"A highway shall be deemed to have been ded-
icated and abandoned to the use of the public when 
it has been continuously used as a public thorough-
fare for a period of ten years." 
The undisputed records of the Salt Lake City Re-
corder's office show that in 1942, which was within a few 
months afer the creation of the joint right of way, the 
parties each executed and delivered deeds conveying their 
respective parcels of land making up the right of way to 
the City with the request that the right of way be dedi-
cated as a public highway which would be an extension 
of Elm Avenue in that area. At that time the general 
public was using it as an access to all the property in 
the area and as a means of a short cut through to High-
land Drive. The City finally decided not to dedicate the 
right of way. However, respondent's conduct in regard 
to the right of way did not change, and the same general 
public use of the right of way that existed at the time 
of the execution of the deeds and request for dedication, 
continued thereafter on even a more expanded basis for 
more than the required statutory ten year period and, 
in fact, continues to this day. Respondent contends that 
subsequently there were placed signs as to permissive use, 
but the evidence shows that these were not placed until 
after the right of way had been used by the general 
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public for more than ten years. The question of the signs 
is discussed in detail in Point VII below and applies in 
full force to the argument on the point under discussion 
here. 
The Utah Court rn the early case of Schettler v. 
Lynch, 23 Ut. 305, 64 Pac. 955 set out rules as to what 
amounts to the dedication of a public highway which have 
been followed in a series of cases since that time: 
"A dedication may be express or implied .... 
If the intention to dedicate is manifest, it is suffi-
cient. An implied dedication is founded on the 
doctrine of ~equitable estoppel ; and when land has 
been thus set .apart as a highway for the use of the 
public, for their convenience and accommodation, 
and enjoyed as such, and private and individual 
rights acquired in relation to it, 'the law' as s.aid 
by the Supreme Court of the United States, 'con-
siders it in the nature of an estoppel in pais, which 
precludes the original owner from revoking such 
dedication.' City of Cincinnati v. White, 6 Pet. 
431, 8 L. Ed. 452. And such an appropriation of 
land is not within the statute of frauds, and may 
be established by parol evidence showing the acts 
and conduct of the owner of the land. In fact, an 
implied dedication of land for public use as a high-
way may be established in any conceivable way by 
which the intent of the owner can be made ap-
parent. . . . 'If the open and known acts are of 
such character as to induce the belief that the 
owner intended to dedicate the way to public use, 
and the public and individuals act upon such con-
duct, proceed as if there had been in fact a dedica-
tion, and acquire rights which would be lost if the 
owner were allowed to reclaim the land, then the 
law will not permit him to assert that there was 
no intent to dedicate no matter what may have 
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been his secret intent.' Elliott, Roads and 8., 
pp. 92, 93." 
The decision of the City Commission not to formally 
dedicate the deeded property as a public street did not 
mean that the way could not become a public highway 
pursuant to 27-1-2 U.C.A. 1953. In the Utah case of 
Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 116 P. 2d 420, in which the Court 
sustained the dedication of a public way it stated: 
"It has been held by numerous courts that the 
grant may be accepted by public use without 
formal action by public authorities, and that 
continued use of the road by the public for such 
length of time and under such circumstances as 
to clearly indicate an intention on the part of the 
public to accept the grant is sufficient.'' 
(Many cases are there cited which support this 
rule) 
In the recent Utah case of Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 
2d 395, 326 P. 2d 107, this Court held that there was 
sufficient evidence as a matter of law to establish the 
dedication of a public highway and used the following 
language in considering the type of use and the accept-
ance required of the public: 
"The use of he road was not great because 
comparatively few people had need to travel over 
it, but those of the public who had such need, did 
so." 
". . . An acceptance could be made 'by public 
use without formal action by public authorities. 
and that continued use of the road by the public 
for such length of time and under such circum-
stances as to clearly indicate an intention on the 
part of the public to accept the grant is suffi-
cient'." (Reference being made by the Court to 
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Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Churnos, 75 Utah 
384, 285 p. 646) 
"This evidence was sufficient as a matter of 
law to establish a highway by dedication and the 
court erred in finding otherwise. The highway 
once having been established by such use, it is 
provided by statute, Sec. 27-1-3 U.C.A. 1953, that 
it ... must continue to be a highway until aban-
doned by order of the Board of County Commis-
sioners.' " 
There is, therefore, ample Utah authority and ex-
press statutory provision to support the dedication of a 
public highway in this case. 
POINT VII. 
There Were No Signs Placed Which Prevented the 
Creation of the Joint and Reciprocal Right of Way By 
Any of the Means Referred to by Appellant. 
The evidence shows that there were no signs of any 
kind posted by the respondent concerning the use of its 
portion of the right of way for several years. (R. 93, 99, 
167, 101-2) Further, the evidence shows that when the 
large first sign was finally posted, it served only to direct 
people to respondent's place of business and "service 
entrance" and contained no language purporting to limit 
or restrict the use of its portion of the right of way. 
(Ex. P-5) It was only in recent years about the time re-
spondent filed its suit in 1954 that a second and smaller 
sign was placed which had language pertaining to per-
missive use. (R. 99, 102, 138, 146) A superficial examina-
tion of the two signs shown in Exhibit P-5 upon which 
respondent relies indicates they are not of the same age 
or era. The smaller permissive use sign is not the same 
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material, construction or printing. These together with 
its very manner and location tell that it was placed as a 
recent after-thought as is contended by appellant. 
Finally, the alleged posting of any restrictive signs 
would be entirely repugnant and inconsistent with the 
conduct and manifest intention of the parties originally 
and over a long period of time as has been discussed 
above. The idea of permissive use is one given recent 
birth by respondent for reasons that will he discussed 
below. 
The respondent relies on the signs shown in its 
Exhibit P -5 to defeat the right of appellant in respond-
ent's portion of the right of way. However, the sign 
painter called as a witness by respondent to establish 
when such signs were placed, testified that he did not 
place them, (R. 156) did not service them, (R. 156) and 
did not know when they were placed (R. 157) His testi-
mony therefore did not establish when either of the signs 
were placed. 
The respondent attempted to establish the time of 
placing and he wording of signs by a witness who is an 
owner and secretary-treasurer of the respondent com-
pany. This witness testified to a sign being posted for 
"as long as I ren1ember," (R. 160) but there is no testi-
mony from him as to the specific language of the sign 
or signs except that Exhibit P-5 contains "a modern 
version." (R. 160-1) This same witness testified on cross 
examination that he had no memory of any of appellant's 
rental sheds which extended entirely across appellant's 
land and which required tearing down to create the right 
of way and no memory of the actual tearing down of these 
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sheds to make the land available for the right of way. 
(H. 161) In view of the undisputed facts that these sheds 
did so exist and that they were actually torn down to 
make appellant's land available for the right of way, 
and that this occurred at about the same general time 
that the posting of some sign was remembered to have 
taken place, this court in reviewing the evidence in this 
equity case is justified in questioning such memory of 
this witness pertaining to the placing of signs and what 
they said. 
The limited knowledge of this witness and the other 
officer witness referred to below concerning the facts 
of this case is demonstrated by their testimony that it 
was not until 1954 that they had any knowledge that 
appellant owned the eastern portion of the land compris-
ing the right of way. (R. 165) 
Respondent next attempted to establish the time of 
placing of signs by testimony of a witness who is an 
owner and who is now president and has always been 
general manager of the respondent company. He re-
membered of a sign being placed about 1944, but he did 
not state what this sign may have said. (R. 167) He re-
membered acquiring the land from which to provide 
respondent's portion of the right of way and of selling 
off part of such land, but he did not have any recollection 
as to about how much was paid for it or how much was 
received for the portion sold. (R. 168) The undisputed 
evidence is that the cost of the original parcel of land ac-
quired by respondent was $300 and that a portion of it 
was sold for $120 and that, therefore, the cost of the land 
contributed by respondent for the right of way was less 
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than $200. (R. 121, 135, 136) 
Certainly none of this testimony reviewed in its most 
favorable light is either convincing or clear as to what 
sign or signs may have been placed, when they were 
placed, and what they said. It is, however, significant 
for two reasons. First, assuming that the large first 
sign was placed as early as 1944 as contended by the gen-
eral manager and that it contained permissive use lan-
guage, (both of which assumptions are controverted by 
other evidence and are repugnant to the theory and basis 
upon which the right of way was created) there elapsed at 
least a three year period of time in which the appellant 
was allowed unrestricted use of the right of way and 
during which time the appellant abandoned its only exist-
ing other right of way and otherwise changed its position 
as has been referred to herein. In such length of time 
and under such circumstances the appellant acquired a 
right over respondent's portion of the right of way by 
estoppel if not by any of the other means discussed in 
this brief. Second, this testimony gives a clue as to why 
the respondent would want to now deny and refuse the 
interest .of the appellant in the right of way. The cost of 
the land acquired by respondent and made available for 
its part of the right of way at the time of its creation was 
about $200.00. (R. 121, 135, 136). The testimony of the 
general manager of the respondent now puts the value 
of this piece of land at $20,000.00. (R. 167) 
On cross examination of appellant's witness, Mr. 
Richards, respondent endeavored to fix the time of plac-
ing the signs shown in Exhibit P -5. The testimony is not 
at all clear that Mr. Richards understood what signs 
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and what locations were being referred to in the course 
of the cross examination. (R. 122-4) Under careful lead-
ing, the witness stated that there may have been a sign 
up for as much as ten years, but he was not at all sure. 
This witness recognized that there were two different 
signs and that they probably went up at different times. 
This is consistent with other evidence which showed that 
when the first of any signs was posted, it was directional 
only, and that the permissive use sign was posted about 
1954 and after strong feelings had arisen between the 
successor representatives of the parties. (R. 99, 102, 138, 
146) ·This witness was unequivocal on cross examination 
that this new right of way was to be a substitute for the 
old one which would be closed and that the new right of 
way would always be left open. (R.120, 122) 
The former secretary of the appellant company testi-
fied that he was connected with such company unil 1945 
and that there were no signs of any kind posted up to that 
time (R. 102) and that the signs in question were posted 
when the rig~t to the use of the right of way was ques-
tioned by the 1954 filing of the lawsuit for rent by re-
spondent. (R.94,99,101,102,146) 
The owner of the appellant company testified defi-
nitely that there were two different signs posted by re-
spondent on the right of way property. These were 
posted at different times. The earlier one was direc-
tional only to the respondent's business. The later one 
had to do with permissive use and was posted in 1954 at 
about the time the suit for rent was filed by respondent. 
(R. 138, 140, 146). 
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Some of the most convincing evidence that the per-
missive use question was not raised by respondent until 
recent years is provided by respondent's own Exhibit P -5. 
All evidence points to the large sign predating the small 
sign shown in the exhibit. The preponderance of the evi-
dence is that the small permissive use sign did not appear 
until about the time respondent questioned appellant's 
right to use the right of way by the filing of the suit in 
1954. A very close examination of the large sign will 
show that originally this sign served as a directional 
sign only. There can he seen showing through the white 
painted arrow the old original words "Service Entrance" 
even though an attempt has been made to paint them 
out. Unwittingly the respondent has been betrayed by its 
own exhibit. Certainly this adds credence to the conten-
tion of appellant that for many years the appellant and 
others used the right of way without any notice or re-
striction by respondent and is compatible with every 
point relied upon by appellant to give it a right to the 
use of the way. 
This is the sum total of the evidence as to signs 
posted, and we submit, that there is no showing that a 
sign was posted that would prevent the creation of the 
joint right of way and the vesting of reciprocal rights 
of the parties in and to the use of it or that would have 
prevented the establishment of a public way. 
POINT VIII. 
It Was Error to Set Aside Respondent's Default 
Judgme·nt on the Counterclaim. 
The setting aside of the default after the expiration 
of more than three months time after its entry was error 
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and directly contrary to the explicit provisions of Rule 
60(b) U.R.C.P. that a motion for such relief based upon 
"mistake, inadvertence, surpr?Jse, or excusable neglect" 
shall not be made more than three months after the judg-
ment or order was entered or taken. 
Added emphasis is given the consideration of this 
point in the light of the history of the suit which shows 
an almost utter lack of interest in it on the part of re-
spondent. 
It is significant that this action all started on March 
30, 1954, by the filing of a complaint by respondent in an 
attempt to recover rent from appellant for its use of re-
spondent's portion of the joint right-of-way. Prior 
thereto, there had been no notice of claim for rent made 
in the more than thirteen years in which the parties had 
reciprocally used the pracels of land making up the joint 
right-of-way. The little merit placed in that complaint by 
respondent is graphically demonstrated by the fact that 
respondent did virtually nothing to advance that suit for 
nearly six years, and respondent subsequently underlined 
its lack of faith in its merits by dismissing the complaint 
on the morning of the trial on October 8, 1959. 
Several years after the filing of the complaint, it 
became apparent that appellant would have to move to 
clear its right to the use of the right-of-way which had 
been put in question by this suit. On September 9, 1958, 
appellant served and filed a notice and motion to amend 
its answer. No one had interest enough to appear at the 
hearing on the motion. Leave was granted by the Court 
to file the amended answer and counterclaim, and a copy 
was duly served on respondent on September 24, 1958. 
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Respondent still did nothing and did not reply to the 
counterclaim, and on Ocober 22, 1958, the default of the 
respondent was entered. More than four months later 
on January 27, 1959, a default judgment was granted and 
entered giving appellant a permanent right to the use of 
the right-of-way. Respondent moved to set aside the 
judgment on February 6, 1959 on the grounds of "mis-
take, inadvertence, surprise and excusable neglect," and 
this was granted 1\larch 18, 1959. 
Rule 60 (b) as it pertains to the setting aside of a de-
fault on the grounds claimed by respondent reads as fol-
lows: 
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court n1ay in the furtherance of justice relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons : ( 1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; ... The motion shall be made 
for reason(s) (1), not more than three months 
after the judgment, order, or proceeding was en-
tered or taken .... " 
The federal rule 60 (b) on this point is identical 
with the Utah rule except that the arbitrary time limita-
tion is one year. The federal cases have uniformly treat-
ed this time limitation as inflexible and jurisdictional 
when relief under the rule is sought on the ground of 
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." 
The rule is stated in Barron & Holtzoff, Federal 
PractiJce and Procedttre (Rules Edition) Volume 3, Sec-
tion 1330, p. 265 as follows: 
"Rule 60 (b) governs the time within which a 
motion mu,st be rnade for relief from a judgment 
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for any of the reasons or grounds enumerated ... 
Motions grounded on mistake, inadvertence, sur-
prise, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence 
or fraud or misconduct of a party must be made 
not later 'than one year after the judgment, order, 
or proceeding was entered or taken'.'' 
The following are quotations from cases construing 
and applying the language of federal rule 60 (b) covering 
judgments, orders, or proceedings, the relief from which 
governed by the specific time limitation of the rule. In 
reading these cases it should be remembered that the 
language of the federal rule and the Utah rule is identical 
on this point except the federal time limitation prior to 
1948 was six months and after that is one year. 
"After expiration of six months, Court was 
without authority to relieve defendant from an 
order of default.'' Cassell v. Barnes, D.C.D.C. 
1940, 1 F.R.D. 15. 
"The one year limitation prescribed in Rule 
60 (b) for filing of motion by defendant for vaca-
tion of default and judgment entered thereon re-
flects the extreme period within which the motion 
might be made, and it must be made within a 
reasonable time which may conceivably be less 
than one year from entry of judgment." Woods v. 
Severson, D.C. Neb. 1949, 9 F.R.D. 84. 
"District Court had no jurisdiction to strike 
out order dismissing cause without prejudice for 
want of prosecution, where motion to strike order 
and restore case to calendar was not made until 
more than six months after entry of the order of 
dismissal." Reed v. South Atlantic S. S. Co. of 
Delaware, D.C. Del. 1942, 2 F.R.D. 475. 
There are many other similar cases cited under Sec. 
1330 of Barron & I-Ioltzoff referred to above. 
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The United States Supreme Court has ruled on fed-
eral rule 60 (h) on a number of occasions. The most re-
cent case was Ackennan v. U.S., Texas, 71 S. Ct. 209, 340 
U.S. 193, 95 L. Ed. 207. This case invloved a motion to 
set aside a judgment canceling a certificate of naturaliza-
tion for the reason of "excusable neglect" under Rule 
60(b). The motion was filed after the express time limit-
ation pro~ided by the rule. The Supreme Court affirmed 
the action of the District ·Court in denying the motion and 
stated: 
"A party's motion for relief from a judgment 
on the ground that his failure to appeal therefrom 
is excusable is a motion for relief because of 'ex-
cusable neglect,' as provided in Rule 60 (b) ( 1) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and hence 
must, by the terms of the Rule, be made not more 
than one year after the judgment was entered .... 
It is immediately apparent that no relief on 
account of 'excusable neglegt' was available to this 
petitioner on the motion under consideration." 
This Court has held that an equity court no longer 
has complete discretion in granting or denying relief 
from a default judgment hut is bound by the prescribed 
three months time of Rule 60(b) when relief is sought 
on any of the specified grounds (including "mistake, in-
advertence, surprise, or excusable neglect") referred to 
in the Rule to which this time applies. To hold otherwise, 
would nullify the express time limitation language of 
the Rule. 
The Utah case of W.arren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 
P. 2d 7 41 in~olved an attempt to set aside a default judg-
ment on the grounds of excusable neglect in a quiet title 
suit 90 days afer the answer was due and 64 days after 
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default had been entered. This court affirmed the district 
court's refusal to set aside the default judgment and 
stated: 
"To hold ... that they have the right to have 
the case reopened since they personally received 
no notice of the action would be to undermine 
the Rules which are positive in their application 
and are designed to expedite litigation.'' 
"And although a judgment may be erroneous 
and inequitable, equitable relief will not be grant-
ed to a party thereto on the sole ground that the 
negligence of the attorney, agent, trustee, or other 
representative of the present complainant pre-
vented a fair trial. Restatement of Judgments, 
Sec. 126." 
The recent Utah case of Ney v. Harr~son, 299 P. 2d 
1114, reaffirms that where relief under Rule 60(b) is 
sought upon any of the first four specified grounds set 
out in 60 (b) (of which "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, 
or excusable neglect" are lumped together as the first 
of the four specified grounds), it must be sought within 
three months from the entry of the default judgment. In 
fact, the Court used the following precise language in 
regard to the time limitation in which relief must be 
sought as follows : 
"Relief upon the first four grounds must be 
sough within three months from the entry of jud-
gment." 
The Court in the Ney case did grant relief from the 
judgment because of a showing under Reason ( 7) of Rule 
60(b). The time limitation for seeking relief under R,ea-
son (7) is "a reasonable time.'' In theN ey case, the Court 
pointed out that: 
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''Defendant Aida did not request relief until 
nearly eleven months had elapsed and, hence, the 
only applicable section of Rule 60 (b) on which he 
could rely was (7)." 
It is clear that the respondent did not intend or at-
tempt to invoke relief under Reason (7) of Rule 60(b) but 
in the second paragraph of its l\fotion to Set Aside De-
fault Judgm.ent (R. 19) respondent uses the express lan-
guage of Reason (1) of Rule 60(b) to-wit: "mistake, inad-
vertence, surprise and excusable neglect." Further, the 
N ey case recognizes the rule set down in the Warren v. 
D~xon Ranch Company case (supra) that: 
"An equity court no longer has complete dis-
cretion in granting or denying relief." 
The intention of the rules to fix an inflexible time 
limitation for the seeking of relief under Rule 60(b) is 
clearly demonstrated by the reference made to it in Rule 
6(b) U.R.C.P. having to do generally with the enlarge-
ment of time. Rule 6 (b) permits the enlargement of the 
time wherein an act is required or allowed to he done at 
or within a specified time, .. where the failure to act was a 
result of an excusable neglect but it provides that the 
Court may not extend the time limitations set out in 
Rule 60 (b) in which action for relief thereunder must be 
taken. Rule 6(b) reads as follows: 
"(b) Enlargement. \Vhen by these rules or 
by a notice given thereunder or bY order of court 
an act is required or allowed to be· done at or with-
in a specified tin1e, the court for cause shown 1nay 
at any time in its discretion (1) with or ·without 
motion or notice order the period enlarged if re-
quest therefor is made before the expiration of the 
period originally prescribed or as extended by a 
44 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
previous order or ( 2) upon motion made after 
the expiration of the specified period permit the 
act to be done where the failure to act was the 
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend 
the time for taking any action under Rules 25, 
50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d), and (e), 60(b), and 73(a) 
and (g), except to the extent and under the condi-
tions stated in them.'' 
Reading Rules 60(b) and 6 (b) together, it must be 
concluded that it is the intention of the rules to make 
the time limitation in which a party must move for relief 
because of Reason (1) of Rule 60(b) a definite and in-
flexible time limitation. In fact, the last portion of Rule 
6(b) is a direct injunction that the court may not extend 
the time for taking action under Reason (1) of Rule 
60(b). The federal court expressly and unequivocally 
so held in Wallace v. U.S. C.C.A. 2d 142 F. 2d 240 certio-
rari denied 65 S. Ct. 37, 323 U.S. 712, 89 L. Ed. 573. 
The default of the respondent was entered on Octo-
ber 21, 1958, and the judgment entered on January 27, 
1959. The respondent has contended that the three 
months time limitation of Rule 60 (b) did not begin to 
run until the date of entry of the judgment on January 
27, 1959. The relief sought under Rule 60(b) is from a 
"final judgment, order, or proceeding." Further, the Utah 
Court in the early case of Cutle-r v. Haycock, 32 U. 354, 
90 P. 2d 897, ruled that the entry of the default is the con-
trolling act and the thing from which relief must be 
sought. This court there stated: 
" ... Where a default has been rightfully 
entered, a party cannot thereafter, as at matter of 
right, arrest the entering of judgment on the de-
fault by simply filing a pleading with the clerk. 
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In order to do this he should obtain leave to file 
it from the Court." 
It is submitted that if respondent's alleged "mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect'' is viewed 
against the background of respondent's marked lack of 
attention to and interest in this case through the years 
after respondent had initiated it, there is actually no 
such showing of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or ex-
cusable neglect" that would support the invoking of 
Reason (1) of Rule 60(b) even if relief had been sought 
within the three month period required by the Rule. Even 
if relief is sought within the time limitation of the Rule, 
it is addressed to the discretion of the court and must be 
based on a good excuse for the default. 
"A motion to set aside a default or a judg-
ment by default is addressed to the discretion of 
the court. . . . In moving to set aside a judgment 
by default the defendant must show both that 
there was good reason for the default and that he 
has a meritorious defense to the action. . . . A 
motion to set aside a judgment by default on the 
ground of neglect of counsel to file an answer has 
been denied where it was not shown that the ne-
glect was excusable .... " (Barron and Holtzoff, 
Federal Practice and Procedure, Rules Edition, 
Vol. 3, Sec. 1217, pp. 53-4) 
The failure of the respondent to file a reply to the 
counterclaim nearly five months after the filing and serv-
ice of it .and nearly four months after entry of default 
falls into the pattern and routine established by respond-
ent in connection with this case as has been previously 
referred to in detail and is not excusable. Respondent, 
therefore, did not qualify for relief under Rule 60 (b) 
either as to time or substance. 
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POINT IX. 
The Failure of the Trial Court to Rule Upon the 
Incompetency of Witnesses to Testify on Particular Matters 
Was Preiudicial Error. 
The provisions of 78-21-3 U.C.A., 1953 require the 
court to decide on all questions of law, and reads as fol-
lows: 
"All questions of law, including the admissi-
bility of evidence, the facts preliminary to such 
admissions, the construction of statutes and other 
writings, and the application of the rules of evi-
dence are to be decided by the Court and all dis-
cussions of law addressed to it." 
The court failed to rule on any of the objections 
raised as to the competency of all witnesses for the appel-
lant to testify concerning conversations and dealings had 
by such witnesses with the original representatives of the 
parties concerning the creation and projected use of the 
joint right of way. (R. 86, 88, 96, 116, 132, 135, 153-4) 
The Memorandum of Decision of the Trial Court (R. 
45) found as follows: 
"1. That there was never an agreement be-
tween the parties creating an interest in the de-
fendant in and to the right of way involved in this 
action." 
Objections were made to the competency of these wit-
nesses to testify concerning any agreement. The court re-
served its ruling until the conclusion of trial, but never 
did rule. We are, therefore, at a loss to know what, if any, 
testimony of appellant's witnesses was considered or not 
considered in making the finding that there never was 
an agreement between the parties creating an interest 
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in the defendant in and to the right of way. It is sub-
mitted that the failure of the court to so rule was preju-
dicial. If there had been a ruling, the appellant would 
have had an opportunity to meet the objection and pre-
sent additional or other evidence by further interroga-
tion of these witnesses or with other witnesses or by more 
extended cross-examination of respondent's witnesses, 
and through the possible use of additional documentary 
evidence. 
The rules in this regard are set out as follows: 
"A ruling on objections to evidence or motions 
to strike evidence should be made as soon as 
possible, either at the time the objections or mo-
tion is made, or during the trial and before judg-
ment rendered, in time to give the opposite party 
the opportunity to meet the objection. The better 
practice is to rule positively, one way or the other, 
when the evidence is offered .... If, however, evi-
dence is received subject to objection, without a 
ruling thereon, a ruling should be made prior to 
the conclusion of the trial, and in time for the 
party to present his case with respect to such 
ruling .... " 
"Improper evidence should not be admitted at 
counsel's risk, but should be excluded in express 
terms or the intention of the court to exclude the 
evidence made clearly to appear." (88 C.J.S. Trml, 
Sec. 145, pp. 289-290; Mayer v. Detroit, etc. R. Co., 
152 :Mich. 276, Lo·uisville, etc. R. Co. v. Collins-
worth, 45 Fla. 403, 33 So. 513, Colltns v. Janes-
ville, 111 Wis. 348, 87 N.W. 241, 1087, Stephens v. 
Harris, 180 Ark. 128, 20 S.W. 2d 866. 
"A distinct ruling, should be made upon an 
objection immediately-in most cases-after the 
objection is interposed. It is not commendable 
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practice to reserve a ruling on an objection, or to 
admit evidence subject to a motion to strike to 
be argued later; in fact, such practice in some 
cases constitutes prejudicial error." (2 Bancroft's 
Code, Practice, and Remedies, Section 1371, page 
1843) 
If the court had ruled on these objections, counsel 
would have had a right and opportunity to request the 
court for its reasons for so ruling. The rule in this regard 
is set out at 88 C.J.S. Trial, Section 145, p. 289 as fol-
lows: 
"Indeed, counsel who is unable to comprehend 
the reason for the exclusion of evidence is entitled, 
on request, to a statement from the court of its 
reasons for exclusion. Evidence cannot be ex-
cluded without assigning a reason, where the 
probability is that the reason for the exclusion 
could have been obviated if known." 
The following are quotations from cases applying 
the above referred to rules: 
"In the case of Gilcrest v. Bowen, 95 Mont. 44, 
24 P .2d 141, this court condemned the practice 
of trial judges taking objections under advisement 
and not thereafter disposing of the same by an ap-
propriate ruling. And again, in Langston v. Cur-
rie, 95 Mont. 57 26 P. 2d 160 vve expressly ap-
proved what was said in the Gilcrest Case, and 
forecast that eventually it would be necessary for 
this court to reverse a cause before it because of 
the failure of the trial court to dispose of objec-
tions or motions which had arisen during the 
progress of the trial ; we again repeat the pro-
phecy there made." (Frisbee v. Coburn, Mont., 52 
P. 2d, p. 882) 
"A judge presiding at the trial of a case 
should rule promptly and clearly upon each and 
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every objection or motion which is made by the 
attorneys, thus not only affording the parties 
the benefit of his judgment and guidance as to the 
future conduct of the trial, but also making a 
crystal clear record for the assistance of an ap-
pellate court when reviewing his action." (Los 
Angeles County v. Beve.rley, 271 P 2d 965) 
In view of the above, the failure of the court to rule 
on these objections was clearly prejudicial to the presen-
tation of appellant's case. 
POINT X. 
The Findings of the Court are Not Responsive to and 
Do Not Cover All of the Material Issues. 
The following language of Rule 52, U.R.C.P. requires 
the court to make findings : 
"In all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall, un-
less the same are waived, find the facts specially 
and state separately is conclusions of law there-
on and direct the entry of the appropriate judg-
ment;" 
Rule 52 also also expressly provides that "Requests 
for findings are not necessary for purpose of review." 
This, of course, is the necessary corrallary to the direc-
tion of the Rule that the facts must be found specially. 
It is reversible error to fail to find on all material 
issues. This rule is stated at 3 Am. Jur., Appeal & Error, 
Sec. 1147, p. 660, as follows: 
"The failure or refusal of the trial court to 
make findings of facts material to the decision 
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The only material issue found by the court and as set 
out in its memorandum decision (R. 45) was "that there . 
was never an agreement between the parties creating an 
interest in the defendant in and to the right of way in-
volved in this action." Further, this is the only material 
finding set out in the findings prepared by respondent 
and signed and filed by the court. (R. 58) 
There were no findings on either of the following 
material issues which were raised by the pleadings and 
supported by evidence: 
1. Appellant acquired an interest in the right of 
way by estoppel. The evidence shows that in reliance 
on the conduct of respondent, appellant changed its posi-
tion to its detriment and prejudice and to the benefit 
of respondent all as alleged in the pleadings and as has 
been detailed earlier in this brief. Appellant in substance 
pleaded into estoppel in its First Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim (R. 9) and urged and argued relief on this 
issue during the course of the trial in the light of the evi-
dence. adduced, although the reporter's transcript does 
not contain a record of the argument of counsel. Appel-
lant specifically pleaded estoppel in its Motion to Amend 
to conform to the evidence and in its Answer and Coun-
terclaim that was amended to conform to the evidencP-
and filed by leave of the court after hearing thereon. (R. 
48, 65) 
2. The right of way has been dedicated and aban-
doned to the use of the public in accordance with 27-1-2 
V:C.A. 1953. This became apparent in the course of the 
evidence adduced at the trial and was specifically pleaded 
51 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in appellant's Motion to Amend to conform to the evi-
• dence and in its Answer and Counterclaim that was 
amended to conform to the evidence and filed. (R. 53, 68) 
The Utah court has held n1any times that the failure 
to find on all material issues is reversible error. 
''The court should find the facts upon every 
issue, either affirmatively or negatively, as the 
evidence may be, and thus give the defeated party 
an opportunity to assail the finding as not being 
supported by the evidence. The court erred in not 
making findings upon the issue of want of au-
thority, and also upon the issue of renunciation 
of the contract." (Thomas v. Clayton Piano Co., 
47 Ut. 91, 151 P. 543) 
"The law is well settled that the findings when 
compared with the pleadings must be within the 
issues and be responsive thereto, and must cover 
the material issues raised by the pleadings, 
whether they arise because of allegations in the 
complaint and, denied by the ans\Yer, or upon af-
firmative defense pleaded in the answer, or upon 
a counterclaim, denied by answer thereto or treat-
ed as denied, and this is required whether evi-
dence be introduced or not upon such issues, and 
if there be no finding upon a material issue the 
judg1nent cannot be supported." (Parowan Mer-
cantile Co. v. Gurr, et al., lTtah, 30 P.2d 207) 
The most recent Utah case of Gaddis Investment Co. 
et al. v. Morris on, 3 Ut. 2d 43, 278 P. 2d 284 interpreted 
what is required in the way of findings by the court under 
Rule 52. In this case, the defendant's ansVi;r;er raised the 
issue of abandonment of the contract but the trial court 
made no finding regarding it. The judgment was set 
aside and the case remanded. This Court in that case 
quoted the language of Rule 52 and stated: 
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"It appears that the judgment was based 
principally upon the findings that the contract 
was entered into and the commission had not been 
paid, totally disregarding defendant's answer to 
the complaint. It has been frequently held that 
the failure of the trial court to make findings of 
fact on all material issues is reversible error 
where it is prejudicial.'' 
The court in the Gaddis case then referred to the fol-
lowing long line of Utah cases that have announced and 
followed this rule: 
Hall v. Sabey, 58 Utah 343, 198 P. 1110; 
Baker v. H.atch, 70 Utah 1, 257 P. 673; 
Prows v. Hawley, 72 Utah 444, 271 P. 31; 
Simper v. Brown, 74 Utah 178, 278 P. 529; 
West v. Standard Fuel Co., 81 Utah 300, 17 P. 2d 
292; 
Pike v. Clark, 95 Utah 235,79 P. 2d 1010. 
Respondent contends that there was an actual or 
implied agreement between the parties as to the use of 
the right of way by respondent as has been previously 
argued. In addition to this, however, the respondent 
submits that had the court considered and made a find-
ing on the issues referred to above, it would have found 
affirmatively in view of the evidence, or at least, such 
findings would now be before this court for review. The 
failure to make these findings, therefore, was prejudicial 
to appellant's case and is reversible error. 
POINT XI. 
The Findings and Judgment are Contrary to the 
Evidence. 
The finding and judgment that there never was an 
agreement between the parties creating an interest in ap-
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pellant in and to the right of way and that appellant has 
no right, title or interest in it, is not supported by the 
evidence. 
Rule 52 (b) reads in part as follows : 
"When findings of fact are made in actions 
tried by the court without a jury, the question of 
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the find-
ings may thereafter be raised whether or not the 
party raising the question has made in the district 
court an objection to such findings or has made 
either a motion to amend them, a motion for judg-
ment, or a motion for a new trial.'' 
Judgments resting upon findings contrary to or not 
supported by the evidence may be set aside. 
"It is well established that findings of fact 
must conform to and he supported by the evi-
dence, and that a judgment resting upon a finding 
not so supported may be set aside upon motion 
for new trial, or appeal." (53 Am. Jur., Trial, Sec. 
1144, p. 798) 
"The rule giving great weight in the appellate 
court to the finding of the trial court on a ques-
tion of fact lays no restraint on the power of the 
former to ascertain, by full and careful investiga-
tion and analysis of the evidence, what the facts 
and circumstances are and ·whether the general 
finding is consistent therewith .... " (3 Am. Jur., 
463-2 Appeal & Error, Sec. 899 pp. 463-64) 
There is uncontroverted evidence in the record that 
at least for a few years (R. 99 , 167, 101, 193) there was 
no dispute concerning the right of appellant to use the 
joint right of way. In fact, the substantial evidence is 
that it was many years before this right to use was put 
in dispute in any way. 
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It is an inescapable conclusion from the evidence 
that the parties had some kind of an understanding giv-
ing appellant a permanent right to use the newly created 
joint right of way. How else can the conduct of the ap-
pellant be ,explained in closing its only existing right 
of way that it must have for its property and which it had 
previously obligated itself to provide for those claiming 
by, through, or under it, in tearing down valuable sheds 
that were producing income in order to provide land 
for the new right of way, and participating physicaily 
in the making of the right of way. 
The respondent does not deny this conduct on the 
part of appellant and significantly does not attempt 
to explain or give reason for it, but argues that such con-
duct on the part of appellant resulted in it ending up 
with only a permissive use in the resulting new and only 
existing right of way. The evidence will not support 
this kind of conclusion. 
There is substantial uncontroverted evidence to show 
either an executed express oral agreement, or an implied 
in fact agreen1ent, all of which have been previously dis-
cussed in detail. 
The findings of the court that there was no agree-
ment between the parties in the face of this kind of evi-
dence is patently contrary to and not supported by the 
evidence. 
There is substantial uncontroverted evidence to sup-
port the creation of a right in the appellant to the use 
of the right of way by estoppel. The evidence establishes 
all of the required elements of a classic equitable estoppel 
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or of a promissory estoppel, and it was contrary to the 
evidence not to so find. 
Finally, there is substantial uncontroverted evidence 
that the parties intended to and did dedicate and abandon 
the jointly created right of way to the use of the public 
and the same has become a public way in accordance with 
27-1-2 U.C.A., 1953, and the failure to so find was con-
trary to the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Although respondent initiated this suit more than 
six years ago to recover rent for the use of a jointly cre-
ated right of way, it did not Inove to advance it any time 
during the pendency of this case. Respondent seemed 
satisfied to have cast a cloud on appellant's right to the 
use of the right of way. Appellant filed an answer and 
counterclaim to determine and protect its right to the 
use of the right of way. 
Appellant contends and the evidence shows that ap-
pellant has a permanent right to the use of the right of 
way by reason of any one or more of the the following: 
An executed oral agreement, estoppel, implied agree-
ment or because the right of way has become a public 
way pursuant to 27-1-2 U.C.A. 1953. 
Appellant further contends that it was error for the 
court to set aside the default judgn1ent which affirmed 
the right of appellant to use the right of way where the 
motion to set aside was based upon "1nisake, inadver-
tence, surpris·e, or excusable neglect" and was filed more 
than three months after entry of default. 
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In reviewing this case this Court is justified in con-
sidering the manner in which it was filed by respondent; 
its utter lack of interest in it; its failure to advance it for 
more than six years, and finally the voluntary dismissal 
of the complaint by respondent. Respondent first as-
serted a right to rent and then abandoned this for the 
inconsistent position of permissive use. These raise seri-
ous questions concerning the reliability of all matters 
asserted by respondent. 
It is respectfully submitted that it would be a gross 
miscarriage of justice if under the facts and circum-
stances here shown, the appellant were to lose its access 
and right to the use of a right of way it jointly partici-
pated in creating. 
It is respectfully requested that the judgment of the 
trial court be reversed and the case remanded with in-
structions to enter judgment for appellant giving appel-
lant and those claiming by, through, or under it the right 
to use the right of way referred to herein in accordance 
with the detailed provisions of the default judgment in 
the record (R. 17) or a judgment that such right of way 
is a public way. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OWEN & WARD 
Cottnsel for Defendant and 
Appellant 
141 East Second South St. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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